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Unscrambling the Confusion:
Applying the Correct





It is well settled that the standard of review applicable to a case may be
crucial to its outcome on appeal. This makes clarity with regard to the
applicable standard of the utmost importance to litigants. This Article
addresses specifically the standard used to review trial courts'decisions
to admit or exclude evidence under rape-shield statutes. While most
jurisdictions apply an abuse of discretion standard, the authors here
examine the inconsistency of the jurisdictions that do not. Ultimately,
the authors assert that the abuse of discretion standard is the best in
these cases and should be applied by all jurisdictions collectively.
Introduction
Every appeal requires the application of a standard of review. And
in most appeals, that standard controls the legal analysis. In some
instances, courts even relate how crucial their standard of review is to
a given appeal.' Often, however, courts seem to go through the motions
when it comes to standards of review-referencing the standard only after
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See, e.g., Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 853, 858 (10th Cir.
2008) (stating that the "standard of review sounds the death knell" of the plaintiff's
claim on appeal).
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appearing to have concluded the outcome. Of course, the preferred
approach is that reviewing courts take standards of review more
seriously.2
Under various states' case law, the applicable standard of review in
evaluating a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under a
rape-shield statute is completely muddled. Litigants in thesejurisdictions
will be well served by a fine tuning of the unclear standards of appellate
review concerning the admissibility of rape-shield evidence.
As discussed below, the trend in mostjurisdictions is that this decision
should be made pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard. We analyze
the appropriateness of universalizing that standard, as well as the merits
of considering a more reflective standard of review.
I. Standards of Review
Although "a discussion of standards of review might appear superfi-
cial, or worse, of little consequence," 3 they "often impact the appeal
more than the facts and the substantive law."4 Indeed, the standard by
which a case will be reviewed on appeal often affects the strategy an
appellate advocate will employ.'
Brandon Harrison describes the spectrum of appellate deference
towards trial-judge decisions as:
(least deference) 4 0 (most deference)
de novo - clearly erroneous - abuse of discretion
6
2 For a partial discussion of some of the implications of differing standards of
review see Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth
Circuit During 2008, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 51, 62-64 (2009).
' Kevin R. Casey et al., Standards ofAppellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Sub-
stance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 279 (2002).
4 ld at 280.
See id. at 281-84.
6 Brandon J. Harrison, Standards of Review on Appeal, in HANDLING APPEALS IN
ARKANSAS 9-1, 9-4 to -14 (2007). Other standards of review exist, particularly those
created by statute. See Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019
(Fed. Cir. 1987) ("5 U.S.C. § 706, subparagraph (2)(E), imposes the 'substantial evi-
dence' standard of review on Commission findings and conclusions. There is a signifi-
cant difference between the standards of 'substantial evidence' and of 'clearly errone-
ous."'). The court in In re Gartside noted that
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These three standards can theoretically be divided into those that provide
deference to trial judges for decisions involving factual determinations
(clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion), and those that govern
appellate courts' review of the trial courts' purely legal determinations
(de novo).' Trial courts' legal determinations are not entitled to any def-
erence, as appellate judges are viewed as being in an equal or, perhaps,
better position than trial judges to make legal determinations.' For the
more complex issues of mixed fact and law, the appellate court must first
determine whether the issues can be disaggregated; if not, the court must
decide whether its abilities to develop the law or the abilities of the trial
court to view the historical facts should determine the level of review.'
Thus, the de novo standard applies to purely legal issues, where the
appellate court should not be influenced whatsoever by the trial court's
decision.' ° Typical cases would include questions of statutory construc-
tion and appeals from summary judgments."
the "substantial evidence" standard asks whether a reasonable fact finder could have
arrived at the agency's decision, and is considered to be a less deferential review
standard than "arbitrary, capricious." The Supreme Court has described "substan-
tial evidence" [as] ... "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion .... Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."
203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Additionally, "the standard
of review for the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is the same as the
standard of review for reviewing ajury's verdict: both the verdict and the denial of the
motion must be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict." Harper
v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). This is not
the ideal use of language, however, to describe the standard of review of ajury verdict.
STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW §§
3.01, 9.01 (3d ed. 1999). The better language is one of reasonableness: "[C]ould rea-
sonable minds reach different conclusions on the evidence presented?" Id. § 3.01; see
also id § 9.01. If so, the appeal of the verdict should be denied. Id.
In addition, the "plain error" standard of review, sometimes referred to as the
"manifest injustice" standard of review, supplants the primary standards of review for
issues raised for the first time on appeal; this standard is highly deferential. HARRY
EDWARDS & LINDA ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 3, 5 (2007).
7 EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 6, at 5-8.
8 Id
9 Id. at 12-16.
0 See Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 268 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Ark. 2007)
(emphasis added) ("[A] circuit court's conclusion on a question of law is reviewed de
novo and is given no deference on appeal.").
" See White County v. City of Judsonia, 251 S.W.3d 275, 277 (Ark.) (deciding
whether a statute authorized county governments to force city courts to levy fines),
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The "clearly erroneous" standard typically applies to factual determi-
nations made by a trial judge.'2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that "[f]indings of fact.., must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility." 3 In Combs v.
Stewart, for example, the court used the clearly erroneous standard to
review the trial court's division of property and debts between a widow
and her husband's estate. 14 The common articulation of the standard is
that "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."'
' 5
The abuse of discretion standard normally applies to circumstances
in which a judge is faced with conditions that require a certain measure
of judgment at trial or because there are no guidelines for deciding the
issue. 6 One scholar describes the abuse of discretion standard as
muddled and "veiled in generality."' 7
remanded to 247 S.W.3d 863 (Ark. 2007); see also Fathauerv. United States, 566 F.3d
1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("This court reviews a grant of summaryjudgment by the
United States Court of Federal Claims de novo" in deciding whether part-time meteor-
ologists employed by the National Weather Service were "employees" within the
meaning of a federal statute.).
2 Atlanta J. & Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation, 442 F.3d 1283, 1287
(11 th Cir. 2006) (Considering the district court's calculation of restitution, the Eleventh
Circuit stated, "We review ... findings of fact upon which the decision to grant
equitable relief was made under the clearly erroneous standard."); see also Lebanon
Farms Disposal, Inc. v. County of Lebanon, 538 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) ("We
engage in plenary review of the District Court's grant of summary judgment.").
1" FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
14 288 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Ark. 2008).
"s Harrison, supra note 6, at 9-6 (citing Thompson v. Bank of Am., 157 S.W.3d
174, 176 (2004); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, reh'g denied,
333 U.S. 869 (1948)).
16 Id. at 9-6, 9-12; see also Re/Max North Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 429
(7th Cir. 2001);Williams v. State, 287 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Ark.), reh'g denied, (2008);
Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 62 (citing Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial
Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 49 (2000)).
17 Harrison, supra note 6, at 9-10 (suggesting only that the decision cannot be
thoughtless, groundless, arbitrary or must display a rational basis). Professor Peter
Nicolas argues that, while courts' common recitation that the admission or rejection of
evidence is discretionary, in practice the standard of review for evidentiary rulings
varies among the standards of de novo, clear error, and abuse of discretion depending
on the evidentiary issues at hand. For example, when relevancy determinations involve
[Vol. 34:281
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The classic example of a matter subject to this level of review is
whether the trial judge properly excluded evidence under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403. " Another candidate for the abuse of discretion standard
would be ajudgment call about the value of professional services. 9 The
difficulty is that courts exercise discretion throughout their decision-
making, and, as such, "an[y] error of law can always be [mis]character-
ized as 'an abuse of discretion.' 20 Trial courts have the "broad[est]
discretion on evidentiary rulings," typically resulting in the application
of the abuse of discretion standard.2'
Under the circumstances where the abuse of discretion standard
normally applies, a judge is given extremely wide latitude in making a
decision, and only when he goes beyond any reasonable position is he
overturned.2 The test to determine whether a judge has abused her
discretion has been expressed in various formulations.2 1 "The question
... is not.., whether the Court of Appeals[] would as an original matter
questions of law, courts tend to apply the de novo standard. Peter Nicolas, De Novo
Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the Standard of Review of
Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 540-42 (2004);
see generally Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review ofDiscretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47 (2000).
," Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (holding it was an abuse of
discretion to admit evidence of a prior conviction where the defendant offered to
stipulate to the prior conviction), remanded to 121 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984) (holding that is was not an abuse of dis-
cretion to admit evidence of details about a prison gang to which a criminal defendant
belonged); see also Williams v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 188 S.W.3d 908, 914-15
(Ark. 2004) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence of a 1980
insurance application in a case where a policy that began in 1993 was at issue).
'9 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11 th Cir.) (stating, "[tihe
abuse of discretion standard applies to the district court's determination of the number
of compensable billable hours, the hourly rate at which plaintiffs' counsel is com-
pensated, [and] the award of costs and expenses"), reh'g en banc denied, 547 F.3d
1319 (2008), cert. granted in part, 129 U.S. 1907 (2009).
20 United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2004).
21 Harrison, supra note 6, at 9-29 to -30.
22 In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11 th Cir. 1994) (stating that "under the abuse
of discretion standard of review there will be occasions in which we affirm the district
court even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call"); cf Thorne
v. State, 601 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ark. 1980) (finding abuse of discretion where a trial
court denied a criminal defendant time to find a new attorney).
23 Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 62.
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have [acted as did the District Court, but rather] ... whether the District
Court abused its discretion in so doing. 24 Another commentator stated:
When reviewing discretionary decisions for abuse, the reviewing court seeks
to determine whether and when the bounds of discretion seem to have been
overreached. . . . [A]buse of guided discretion occurs either when the
decisionmaker has considered incorrect factors (or has failed to consider
necessary factors) in applying his discretion, or when his exercise of
discretion (the choice he makes within his authority) is contrary to the
evidence or experience, or is so arbitrary, on its own terms, that the appellate
court feels compelled to reject the actual choice. Reversal may be ordered
because the process of the decisionmaking (rather than the decision itself)
is unacceptable. The appellate court may also reverse for some combination
of these errors, but still is generally deferential to the overall process and
decision and will refuse to reverse exercises of discretion hastily or lightly.25
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized, however, that "discretionary
choices are not left to a court's 'inclination, but to its judgment; and its
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles."' 26 Thus, "[a]buse
is found when the trial court has gone outside the framework of legal
standards or statutory limitations, or when it fails to properly consider
the factors on that issue given by the higher courts to guide the discretion-
ary determination."' "2 Otherwise, discretion would be unbounded and,
therefore, not subject to abuse whatsoever. Absent these significant
departures, though, the court's decision is protected even if unwise.2"
The appellate court does not review the decision itself, but, rather, "the
manner of making it."
29
The many different formulations of the abuse of discretion standard
reflect the understanding "that there is no such thing as one abuse of
discretion standard. It is at most a useful umbrella term .... [T]his
multifaceted standard of review more accurately describes a range of
24 Id. at 62-63 (quoting Davis, supra note 17, at 50).
25 Davis, supra note 17, at 54-55; see Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 63.
26Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747,784 (1982)
(quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692)
(Marshall, C.J.)); see Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 63; Davis, supra note 17, at 58.
27 Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 63 (quoting Davis, supra note 17, at 59).
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting Davis, supra note 17, at 59).
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appellate responses with varying degrees of deference handed down.i
3 °
And if an appellate court determines that a trial court erred beyond any
deference that it is afforded under this standard, the availability of a
remedy will generally still be subject to a harmless error analysis.
31
II. Variation in Appellate Standard
for Rape-Shield Evidence
Rape-shield statutes render evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct
inadmissible, unless the trial j udge determines-after a pre-trial or "rape-
shield" hearing-that a piece of evidence is so relevant as to outweigh
its prejudicial nature.32 Allegations of sexual abuse that the victim asserts
30 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 4.01; cf Casey et al., supra note 3, at 292-
97, 300-07, 360 (discussing different levels of review within each standard).
3' EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 6, at 5.
32 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. Rule 412 provides:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.
The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury, or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the
accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights
of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged
victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the
alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must-
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing
the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for
good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, when
appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
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to be true33 constitute prior "sexual conduct" under a rape-shield analy-
sis. 34 Most states review rulings of admissibility of evidence under rape-
shield laws for an abuse of discretion only.35  We analyze here the
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing
in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The
motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain
under seal unless the court orders otherwise.
Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (b) (1987) (amended 1993) ("In any criminal
prosecution under § 5-14-101 et seq. or § 5-26-202 ... opinion evidence, reputation
evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the
defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual
conduct with the defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to
be true, or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual
conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies mak-
ing the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct examination
of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other prosecution
witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense,
or for any other purpose.").
At least one commentator, however, criticized the rape-shield statute for being
"poorly drafted" due to its vagueness. 3 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., TRIAL HANDBOOK
FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 41:2 (2010-11 ed.).
" For obvious reasons,false allegations of sexual abuse do not qualify for protec-
tion under the rape-shield statute and may be admissible as relevant to the victim's
credibility. See West v. State, 722 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Ark. 1987) (per curiam) (supp.
opinion denying petition for reh'g); HALL, supra note 32, § 41: 10.
14 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(b) (1987) (amended 1993); see, e.g., Ridling v.
State, 72 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Ark. 2002), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1918 (2009).
" See United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1986); Exparte Dennis,
730 So. 2d 138, 143 (Ala. 1999); Bibbs v. State, 814 P.2d 738, 741 (Alaska Ct. App.
1991); People v. Chandler, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v.
Garcia, 179 P.3d 250, 255 (Colo. App. 2007); State v. Cecil J., 970 A.2d 710, 714-15
(Conn. 2009); Scott v. State, 642 A.2d 767, 770, 771 (Del. 1994); Bryant v. United
States, 859 A.2d 1093, 1104 (D.C. 2004); Esteban v. State, 967 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); George v. State, 356 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1987); People v. Santos,
813 N.E.2d 159, 162 (III. 2004); Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714, 721 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009); State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1997); State v. Perez, 995 P.2d
372, 376 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705,
721 (Ky. 2009); State v. Dixon, 982 So. 2d 146,155, 156 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Johnson
v. State, 632 A.2d 152, 156 (Md. 1993); Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 63
(Mass. 2005); People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Mich. 1984); State v.
Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986); Forrest v. State, 863 So. 2d 1056, 1065
(Miss. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Davis, 186 S.W.3d 367, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State
v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 491 (Mont. 2001); State v. Johnson, 609 N.W.2d 48, 54
(Neb. Ct. App. 2000); Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Nev. 1985); State v.
Spaulding, 794 A.2d 800, 805 (N.H. 2002); State v. Cuni, 733 A.2d 414, 426 (N.J.
1999); State v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869, 875 (N.M. 1997); People v. Lane, 47 A.D.3d
1125, 1128 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); State v. Herring, 370 S.E.2d 363, 370 (N.C. 1988);
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disparity created by those jurisdictions that, through a variety of other
approaches, do not.
Several states review trial court decisions regarding rape-shield
evidence under relatively muddled standards.36 Arkansas is a prime
example. Under Arkansas case law, the applicable standard of review
in evaluating a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under
the rape-shield statute is whether the court committed "clear error or a
manifest abuse of discretion."37 This standard, however, simply does not
exist. As a logical matter, the standard of review could be either clear
error or abuse of discretion, but not both.
In Swaim v. Arkansas, Judge D. Price Marshall of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals recently recognized the problem posed by this "standard."3
This standard of review is [actually] two standards: clear error or abuse of
discretion.... The combination of these alternative standards is unstable:
review for an abuse of discretion is less searching than review for a clear
error, which is most commonly associated with the evaluation of a circuit
court's findings of fact after a bench trial under Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a).... [T]he supreme court should consider clarifying how hard an ap-
39pellate court must look at a circuit court's ruling on the statutory exception.
State v. Kautzman, 738 N.W.2d 1, 9 (N.D. 2007); State v. Young, No. 92127, 2009
WL 3216611, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009), available at 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4505;
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940, 942 (Pa. 1994); State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d
1022, 1035 (R.I. 2004); State v. Woodfork, 454 N.W.2d 332, 336 (S.D. 1990); State
v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Dudley, 223 S.W.3d 717, 725
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Tarrats, 122 P.3d 581, 588 (Utah 2005); State v. Lund,
664 A.2d 253, 255 (Vt. 1995); State v. Posey, 167 P.3d 560, 565 (Wash. 2007); State
v. Guthrie, 518 S.E.2d 83, 89 (W. Va. 1999); State v. Jackson, 575 N.W.2d 475, 485
(Wis. 1998). But see State v. Robinson, 803 A.2d 452, 457 (Me. 2002).
36 See Joyner v. State, 303 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Ark. 2009); see, e.g., State v. Fowler,
200 P.3d 591, 595 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Muyingo, 15 P.3d 83 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000)); Dill v. State, 2005 OK CR 20, 122 P.3d 866, 868 (Okla. Crim. App.
2005); Robinson, 803 A.2d at 457; State v. West, 24 P.3d 648,652, 653 (Haw. 2001);
State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Fernane,
914 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)); State v. Winkler, 736 P.2d 1371, 1379
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
31 See Allen v. State, 287 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Ark. 2008) ("This court will not reverse
the circuit court's decision as to the admissibility of rape-shield evidence unless its
ruling constituted clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion.") (citing Rounsaville v.
State, 273 S.W.3d 486,491 (Ark. 2008)).
3' No. CA CR 09-143, 2009 WL 2777999, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2009),
available at 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 698.
'9 Swaim, 2009 WL 2777999, at * I n. 1. Judge Marshall was a rightfully well-
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Swaim had been convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend's six-
year-old daughter.4' The trial court in Swaim held a pre-trial hearing
where it addressed the relevance of the victim's prior abuse to the charges
against Swaim.41 The circuit court held that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble under the rape-shield statute.42 Swaim's appeal questioned this
evidentiary ruling.43 On appeal, he challenged the conviction by arguing
respected appellate judge on the Arkansas state middle appellate court. See ARK.
JUDICIARY, http://courts.state.ar.us/coa/index.cfin (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). He was
recently confirmed for a Federal District Court opening in the Eastern District of
Arkansas and replaces U.S. District Judge William R. Wilson. See Marshal Confirmed
as New Arkansas Federal Judge, ARK. NEWS (May 5, 2010), available at http://
arkansasnews.com/2010/05/05/marshall-confirmed-as-new-arkansas-federal-judge/.
Judge Wilson was one of eight judges (out of over sixty district judges in the Eighth
Circuit) who were reversed in two or more cases by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit based on an abuse of discretion standard during 2008, excluding
reversals relating to sentencing guidelines given the state of flux of this area of the law
during the time period being examined, Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 64, and one of only
nine if no exclusions are applied. Robert Steinbuch, Further Insights from My Em-
pirical Analysis of the Eighth Circuit (forthcoming 2011).
While on the state court of appeals, Judge Marshall confronted various challenging
Arkansas state precedents. In Tipps v. State, Marshall dealt with the admissibility of
lay-person owner valuation of personal property-an unfortunate practice employed
from time-to-time in Arkansas courts-particularly when such valuation relates to
goods whose price can be readily determined through third party pricing organizations
(e.g., the Kelley Blue Book for used cars). No. CACR 80-1120, 2009 WL 1233469
(May 6, 2009), available at 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 274. In Tipps, the value of a stolen
car was at issue in determining the level of larceny for the defendant. Id. at * I. While
this should be a relatively straight forward issue, the case was complicated by
deficiencies of both the prosecutor and the defense attorney. See id. The prosecutor
failed to put on expert testimony of the stolen car's value-something easily done
through, inter alia, a used-car-salesperson, and the defense attorney failed to object on
these grounds. Id. Such lapses are particularly unfortunate in criminal cases, and trial
judges would do well to provide some guidance on such issues during a trial. One
possible solution is for courts to take judicial notice (see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201') of
prices that can be readily determined through third party pricing organizations such as
the Kelley Blue Book. Even if such sources were not to be used for specific valuation,
they could be used to determine price ranges. Thus, in those criminal cases where the
value of the stolen item is a factor (e.g., grand larceny), the court could determine
whether the minimum threshold amount was met. This would be an improvement over
having an owner testify as to value. The latter could be reserved for those circum-
stances in which the fungible good was made unique due to some particularized
transformation.
40 Swaim, 2009 WL 2777999, at * I.
41 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(c)(2)(C) (1999).
42 Swaim, 2009 WL 2777999, at * I.
43 Id.
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that the circuit court erred in not permitting him to show that another man
had sexually abused the victim in the past.4 According to Swaim, that
prior abuse provided the girl with an alternate source of sexual knowl-
edge.45 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's
decision and held that the instability of the standard of review was of no
consequence.46
To date, Arkansas courts have used the "clear error or a manifest abuse
of discretion" standard twenty-six times in reviewing admissibility
determinations made under the rape-shield statute since it first appeared
in Byrum v. State.47 In creating this "standard," the Byrum court relied
on case law mentioning and applying either one of those standards-
rather than both of them in tandem.48
Specifically, Byrum cited Drymon v. State49 and Gaines v. State5" for
adopting the manifest abuse of discretion and clear error standards,
respectively.51 The court in Gaines, however, only employed the clear
error standard-relying on Manees v. State52 and Houston v. State, 3 both
of which addressed the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct
in rape cases.54 Following the manifest abuse of discretion line of cases,
Drymon cited Laughlin v. State55 and Logan v. State.56 While Laughlin's
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at * I n. I (stating that "the circuit court's decision withstands scrutiny under
both standards").
47 884 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Ark. 1994).
4' Byrum, 884 S.W.2d at 254.
49 875 S.W.2d 73 (Ark. 1994), denial of post-conviction relief aff'd, 938 S.W.2d
825 (Ark. 1997).
50 855 S.W.2d 956 (Ark. 1993), denial ofpost-conviction relief aff'd, No. CR 94-
531, 1995 WL 93692 (Feb. 27, 1995), available at 1995 Ark. LEXIS I 11.
"I Byrum, 884 S.W.2d at 254.
52 622 S.W.2d 166 (Ark. 1981).
13 582 S.W.2d 958 (Ark. 1979).
14 Gaines, 855 S.W.2d at 958.
" 872 S.W.2d 848 (Ark. 1994), denial ofpost-conviction relief affd, No. CR 97-
933, 1998 WL 811544 (Nov. 19, 1998), available at 1998 Ark. LEXIS 646.
"Admissibility of prior sexual conduct is discretionary with the trial court." Laughlin,
872 S.W.2d at 853.
56 776 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 1989), denial of habeas corpus rev 'dsub nom. Logan v.
Lockhart, 94 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1057 (1994).
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vague formulation of the standard of review actually cited Gaines-
which employs a clear error standard-for support, Logan relied on a
murder case-Bennett v. State57-for the proposition that the manifest
abuse of discretion standard applies.5"
Interestingly, the court in Drymon ruled without any recognition of
Gaines, which was decided roughly eleven months prior.59 Additionally,
while the Gaines court stated that it applied a clear error standard, it may
actually have been inching toward an abuse of discretion standard.6" The
court stated, "[t]he trial court is vested with a great deal of discretion in
ruling whether prior sexual conduct of a prosecuting witness is relevant,
and we do not overturn its decision unless it was clearly erroneous. 61
Although one cannot know whether the Gaines court would have acted
any differently if it had clearly applied an abuse of discretion standard
or a clear error standard, the court, by its own admission, gave great
deference to the trial court and let the trial judge's decision stand.62
Curiously, one author cites an Arkansas case-State v. Babbs63-for
the proposition that "rape shield rulings, where reviewed, are examined
under an abuse of discretion standard., 64 The Babbs court, however,
57 759 S.W.2d 799 (Ark. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
58 Logan, 776 S.W.2d at 334. The use of the modifier "manifest" does not alter the
applicability of the abuse of discretion standard. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note
6, § 4.02 n.3 ("Sometimes the abuse of discretion test is stated generally in terms of
clear abuse or manifest error. Often in such cases (except in the expert context... ),
manifest error appears to define abuse of discretion."). At times, appellees will try to
emphasize the term in the apparent hope that the appellate court will apply a different
standard to the decision of the trial judge. At best, however, appellees are justified in
emphasizing the fluid nature of the standard. See id. § 4.0 1(C). Reversal under this
standard remains the most significant disapproval by an appellate court. Steinbuch,
supra note 2, at 63.
" Drymon v. State, 875 S.W.2d 73, 73-79 (Ark. 1994), denial of post-conviction
relief aff'd, 938 S.W.2d 825 (Ark. 1997). Gaines was decided on June 28, 1993, and
Drymon was decided on May 2, 1994.
6 See Gaines v. State, 855 S.W.2d 956, 958-59 (Ark. 1993), denial ofpost-convic-
tion relief aff'd, No. CR 94-531, 1995 WL 93692 (Feb. 27, 1995), available at 1995
Ark. LEXIS I11.
6 Id at 958 (emphasis added) (citing Manees v. State, 622 S.W.2d 166 (Ark.
1981)).
62 Id at 960.
61 971 S.W.2d 774 (Ark. 1998).
6' Douglas E. Beloof, Enabling Rape Shield Procedures Under Crime Victims'
Constitutional Privacy Rights, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 291, 301 n.52 (2005).
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recited Arkansas's "clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion" stand-
ard.65
Further review of Arkansas's standard reflects even more confusion.
The adjective "manifest" modifying "abuse-of-discretion," if anything,
moves the abuse of discretion standard to the right (towards more
deference) on the standard of review spectrum.66 As such, the two
standards combined by Arkansas courts may be even more incongruous
with each other than they would be absent the "manifest" modifier. We
say "if anything" because the use of the term "manifest" simply may be
used to further reflect that an appellate court will only hold a trial judge
in violation of the abuse of discretion standard when thatjudge's decision
demonstrates the greatest departure from permissible decision-making.67
Regardless, the concurrent recitation of the clearly erroneous standard
casts doubt on whether such deference applies.
Maine seems to follow an approach similar to the confusing hybrid
method employed by Arkansas.68 The Maine Court of Appeals, in State
v. Robinson,
review[ed] the exclusion of evidence under Rule 412 [regarding past sexual
behavior of the victim] for abuse of discretion and for clear error, and...
the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
Rule 403 [regarding the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time] for an abuse of discretion.69
65 Babbs, 971 S.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
66 See supra Part 1.
67 See Steinbuch, supra note 2, at 63. Eight out of the over sixty district judges in
the Eighth Circuit were reversed for abusing their discretion more than once in the
calendar year 2008, adjusting out sentencing-guideline cases due to the transitional
nature of this area of law. Those judges are Gary A. Fenner, Western District of Mis-
souri; Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Western District of Missouri; Jean C. Hamilton, Eastern
District of Missouri; Charles B. Kornmann, District of South Dakota; Nanette K.
Laughrey, Western District of Missouri; James M. Rosenbaum, District of Minnesota;
Karen E. Schreier, District of South Dakota; and William R. Wilson, Jr., Eastern
District of Arkansas. Id. at 64.
68 See State v. Robinson, 803 A.2d 452 (Me. 2002).
69 803 A.2d 452,457 (Me. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Maine Rule
of Evidence 412 provides:
(a) In a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape, gross sexual
misconduct, or sexual abuse of a minor, reputation or opinion evidence of past
sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such crime is not admissible.
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Maine seems to follow an approach similar to Arkansas's because an
earlier case suggested that Maine applies an abuse of discretion standard:
"Significantly, there is in the record no offer of proof by defense counsel
pursuant to [Maine Rule of Evidence] 103, which might now support a
conclusion that the Superior Court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of the victim's past alleged sexual behavior."7 Perhaps because
the Maine court uses "and" between "discretion" and "clear error," the
court means to say that a clear error ofjudgment is the equivalent of an
abuse of discretion. The difficulty with that forgiving construction of
the court's language is that it allows the court's articulation of its stand-
ards to remain sloppy at best. And, of course, when the formulation uses
the word "or" rather than "and"-as exists in other states--one would
be required to provide an even more charitable interpretation of the
standard to read out any conflict.7"
A recent United States military court also employed language
suggesting its use of either a muddled combination of standards, or a
failure to well articulate the standard it was employing.7 2 According to
the appellate court, the military trial judge's ruling excluding evidence
proffered by the defense under exceptions to the rape-shield rule "usurped
the role of the panel members, and was clear error, and, as a result, an
abuse of discretion.
Oklahoma courts have also conflated abuse of discretion with clear
error in evidentiary determinations. In one case, an Oklahoma criminal
(b) In a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape, gross sexual
misconduct, or sexual abuse of a minor, the only evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior that may be admitted is the following:
(I) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with persons other than
the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was
or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with the accused offered
by the accused on the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the
sexual behavior with respect to which the accused is charged.
ME. R. EvID. 412.
70 State v. Albert, 495 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Me. 1985) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
7' See Robinson, 803 A.2d at 456-57.
72 United States v. Zak, 65 M.J. 786, 792-94 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007).
71 Id at 793.
74 See Dill v. State, 2005 OK CR 20, 9, 122 P.3d 866, 869 (Okla. Crim. App.
2005).
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appeals court stated: "The decision to admit evidence [under Oklahoma's
rape-shield statute] is discretionary with the trial court whose decision
will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous or manifestly
unreasonable."75
Courts in Arizona and Oregon have skirted the question of standard
of review under the rape-shield rule by suggesting that evidence barred
under rape-shield statutes might also have been excluded as unfairly
prejudicial.76 The court in State v. Gilfillan stated that, "[a]lthough a false
accusation of sexual misconduct against another person by the alleged
rape victim is an exception to the general [rape-shield] ban on evidence,
... the court has considerable discretion in determining whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly
prejudicial effect."77
In Idaho, the standard of review seems to depend on the evidence at
issue.7" Hawaii's approach to its rape-shield rule is confused as well:
"When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct
result, the proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard.
However, the traditional abuse of discretion standard should be applied in
the case of those rules of evidence that require a 'judgment call' on the part
of the trial court.,
79
The court went on, however, to state that "the trial court's determination
of preliminary factual issues concerning the admission of evidence will
be upheld unless clearly erroneous."'
75 Id. 5, 122 P.3d at 868.
76 State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077-78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Fowler,
200 P.3d 591, 595 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 210 P.3d 905 (Or. 2009).
77 Gilfillan, 998 P.2d at 1077-78 (citing State v. Fernane, 914 P.2d 1314, 1318
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)); see Fowler, 200 P.3d at 595 (trial courts' rulings under the rape
shield rule are reviewed for abuse of discretion only insofar as they are based on a
determination of the evidence's "prejudicial effect").
" Compare State v. Winkler, 736 P.2d 1371, 1379 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (stating
the trial judge "exercis[ed] his discretion under I.C. § 18-6105 [Idaho's rape-shield stat-
ute]"), with State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 925 (Idaho 1986) (describing evidence ex-
cluded by the trial court under the rape shield statute as "relevant, as a matter of law").
79 State v. West, 24 P.3d 648, 652-53 (Haw. 2001) (quoting Kealoha v. County of
Haw., 844 P.2d 670, 676 (Haw. 1993)).
" Id. at 657 (quoting State v. McGriff, 871 P.2d 782, 791 (Haw. 1994)). Absent
this rejoinder, the court's formulation would have looked similar to the one articulated
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III. Recommendation
Because the standard of review applicable to any given case may be
crucial to its outcome on appeal, appellate courts should apply a single
well-defined standard when reviewing rulings on the admissibility of
rape-shield evidence. For those states adhering to an unclear standard
or a muddled combination of standards, the adoption of a single, clear
standard of review would give litigants better guidance in assessing their
chances of success if they opt to appeal an evidentiary ruling under the
rape-shield statute."1 As such, it would make litigants' decisions to
appeal more informed and inject the appellate process with greater
certainty and accountability.
One could argue that the abuse of discretion standard should apply
because evidentiary rulings typically are reviewed for abuse of discretion,
and the decision to admit or reject evidence under the rape-shield statute
is an evidentiary ruling. "[A] district court has wide discretion in admit-
ting and excluding evidence-reviewed for abuse of discretion-and will
not be reversed absent a showing that the ruling had a substantial
influence on the jury's verdict." 2 By following such an approach, the
outlier jurisdictions would join the overwhelming majority of states in
applying an abuse of discretion standard.
However, this position has been the subject of some historical debate.83
As one scholarly jurist pointed out in United States v. Blue Bird, a case
involving the federal rape-shield statute contained in Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, as well as propensity evidence in sexual-assault cases
under Federal Rule of Evidence 413 4 and related evidentiary issues,
in the United States v. Blue Bird dissent discussed below. 372 F.3d 989, 994-96 (8th
Cir. 2004); see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
s' See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(b) (1987) (amended 1993).
82 Harrisv. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135, 1139 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (stating
"a district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion")
(citing United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 909 (2005)).
" See Blue Bird, 372 F.3d at 996-97 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
84 Federal Rule 413 provides, in pertinent part, that "[iln a criminal case in which
the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
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[t]here is some confusion in our cases on the proper standard of review with
respect to evidentiary issues. We have sometimes said that in reviewing a
district court's admission of evidence we review for an abuse of discretion.
Strictly speaking, however, this is not correct. Some rules require a balancing
of how particular evidence might affect the jury, and we properly accord
deference to the trial judge on such questions. But a district court's
interpretation and application of most rules of evidence are matters of law.
Of course, an error of law can always be characterized as "an abuse of
discretion," but our review in cases like the present one is more accurately
characterized as de novo.85
The dissent argued otherwise:
Generally, we review matters of law de novo. Therefore, to the extent that
a district court's admission of evidence involves a legal interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary and de novo.
Once we determine that the district court properly interpreted the rules,
however, we extend greater deference in reviewing the court's ultimate
decision to admit or exclude the evidence, principally because that decision
can involve the careful balancing of competing factors. 6
While the dissent suggested that the majority's view of the appropriate
standard of review for the admission of rape-shield and related evidence
was novel, the dissent's approach also was out of the mainstream. 7 The
dissent essentially articulated a two-step standard for evidentiary ques-
tions: de novo, then abuse of discretion. 8 While this might occur in
practice, such an explicit bifurcation is not common.89 Moreover, the
majority's approach was short lived: "We implicitly overruled our hold-
ing.., that we review de novo a district court's admission of evidence."9"
Other learned judges have supported the rationale of the Blue Bird
court.9 In discussing whether the level of review that an appellate court
" United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989,991 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted);
see also Cent. Freight Lines v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1981) (deciding
a hearsay issue as a matter of law).




90 Harris v. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135, 1139 n.2 (citing United States v. Chase, 451
F.3d 474, 479 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006)).
9' See Friendly, supra note 26, at 783-84.
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should apply to the appeal of whether a document was subject to the
hearsay rule-a question that the iconic Judge Friendly aptly character-
ized as "classical instance of application of law to the facts"-Judge
Friendly suggests a de novo analysis as the appropriate level of appellate
review.9 2 "It would be unfortunate if the work of the Advisory Commit-
tee and the Congress in framing carefully tailored exceptions to the
hearsay rule and formulating other evidentiary rules should be dissipated
by a blur of undifferentiated expressions with respect to the 'discretion'
of the trial judge."93 Judge Friendly contrasted, however, that a Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 analysis is one subject to the abuse of discretion
standard on appellate review.94 However, this more sophisticated
approach-one that differentiates between complex legal questions that
are deserving of greater appellate scrutiny and those less scholarly
decisions that necessitate a standard of deference-has garnered little
support.95
Moreover, a review of the admission of rape-shield evidence vel nom
requires a significant exercise of judgment, and it can be distinguished
from hearsay evaluations, which are largely legal questions.96 As such,
while not ideal, particularly given its vague and varying formulation, the
abuse of discretion standard fits best for the review of rape-shield
decisions. While the application of the rape-shield law requires a more
significant legal analysis than the classic Rule 403 investigation,97 this
92 Id at 782.
93 Id.
94 Id.
9' See id at 782-83.
96 See State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1990).
97This is especially true, for example, with respect to determinations under Arkan-
sas's five-factor analysis developed in State v. Townsend, 233 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Ark.
2006). Following the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pulizzano, the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Townsend adopted a five-factor test "for which the defen-
dant must offer proof prior to trial in order to admit evidence of a child's prior sexual
conduct for limited purpose of proving an alternative source for sexual knowledge."
Townsend, 456 N.W.2d at 685. The five factors require a court to compare prior sexual
conduct to conduct alleged in the present act and include determining whether the
previous act occurred, how similar the two acts are, whether the previous act is
materially relevant to an issue in the present case, whether the evidence from the prior
act is relevant to the present case, and whether the "probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect." Id. (citing Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 335).
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mixed question does not seem sufficiently legal to argue for the applica-
tion of the de novo standard.
Furthermore, this attempt at fine-tuning may simply be unwelcome
by the courts:
Now, however, the Supreme Court seems bent on returning to prior
obfuscation by clumping together all [evidentiary] review under one label,
abuse of discretion, to cover law fact, and discretion. Whether this guidance
is to be applied across the board and exactly what such application might
mean as a practical matter are yet unclear. The Court states its position as
an attempt to keep things simple-why use several standards when one will
do? The Court says that abuse of discretion subsumes clearly erroneous
factfindings or legal error. What the Court does not tell us is how to deter-
mine whether the factfindings are clearly erroneous or conclusions of law
are erroneous without actually reviewing the facts and law under those
separate standards. What the Court appears to be suggesting is not that
reviewing courts actually change the standards but that they cease labeling
the issues as requiring different review. Several scholars have suggested
that all standards tend to come together into some character of reasonable-
ness review, but reasonableness is a lot like "plain meaning" in statutory
construction-the "plain meaning" depends entirely on who is doing the
construction. It is ... unclear what is to be gained by this unitizing of
standards [other than intellectual and jurisprudential indolence]."
These commentators further state:
It may be, of course, that no practical difference results from the[] appellate
characterizations [of the standard of review], since erroneously admitted
evidence likely will constitute an abuse. [Such a notion is dangerous, hiow-
ever, [because] traditionally, a lax.., standard defines how hard the appeals
court looks for error, and in the final analysis, legal error may be more easily
excused under review only for abuse of discretion. 9
Moreover, weak review standards lead to-and have led to-sloppiness
by trial judges well aware that they are under no obligation (to the appel-
late courts, at least) to master the rules of evidence. 0°
With that said, given the need for uniformity and the clear direction
that appellate courts have taken with evidentiary-rulings review, we
98 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 11.02.
99 Id. § 4.02.
'00 See id.
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recommend that appellate courts adopt the abuse of discretion standard
for purposes of reviewing on appeal trial courts' decisions to admit or
to reject evidence under a rape-shield statute. We leave for another day
the broader question of revamping appellate review of decisions to admit
evidence vel nom, as well as the effect of lax standards on the level of
competence demanded of trial judges.
The abuse of discretion standard will best serve both litigants and
courts: litigants will be more informed about their chances of success
on appeal and appellate courts will be familiar with the concept of
reviewing evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. As such, adoption
of the abuse of discretion standard would simplify and lend predictability
to appellate analyses in this area of the law.
Conclusion
The use of unclear standards of review for issues of rape-shield
evidence unfortunately presents an image that the law regarding appellate
review lacks sophistication. State courts employing a confusing combina-
tion of standards would do well to refine their approach in this important
area of the law in order to provide the clearest guidance possible. For
those states with confused standards of review for rape-shield decisions,
we recommend adopting an abuse of discretion standard. This would
streamline the appellate process with respect to rape-shield rulings for
the benefit of the judiciary and inject the appellate process with certainty
and transparency for the benefit of litigants.
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